Sequential procurement auctions
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- J. Reiß & Jens Schöndube, 2010.
"First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 99-141, April.
- Reiss, J. Philipp & Schï¿½ndube Jens Robert, 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2006.
"Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 176-194, March.
- Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2004. "Best Foot Forward or Best for Last in a Sequential Auction?," Working Papers 2004-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2002. "Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 431-444, August.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017.
"Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 35-63.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2015. "Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112903, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2015. "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Working Papers 15-02, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2017. "Ex-Post Optimal Knapsack Procurement," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 27, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Yildirim, Huseyin, 2004. "Piecewise procurement of a large-scale project," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1349-1375, November.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2004. "Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 78-95, July.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 1999. "Procurement and Information Feedback," Research Papers in Economics 2000:2, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- repec:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0587-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
- Gonzalo Cisternas & Nicolás Figueroa, 2015. "Sequential procurement auctions and their effect on investment decisions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 824-843, October.
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