Evolutionary minority games with small-world interactions
In the evolutionary minority game (EMG), agents compete for a limited resource and are rewarded if they correctly select the minority behaviour. At each time step, agents make their decision based on the aggregate history of past moves and an internal parameter—the probability that the individual follows the given strategy. In this study, the effects of strategic imitation among agents are examined. Here, I combine and extend previous work using local information transmission mechanisms to promote coordination in the population. Extensive numerical simulations using different network architectures, ranging from regular lattices to random networks, are used to investigate the population dynamics. The results suggest that agents sharing information in small-world networks can coordinate their behaviour more effectively than agents playing the standard EMG. However, both the network re-wiring probability and level of imitation significantly impact on performance.
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Volume (Year): 365 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- Quan, Hong-Jun & Wang, Bing-Hong & Hui, P.M. & Luo, Xiao-Shu, 2003. "Self-segregation and enhanced cooperation in an evolving population through local information transmission," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 321(1), pages 300-308.
- Challet, D. & Zhang, Y.-C., 1997. "Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 246(3), pages 407-418.
- Schweitzer, Frank & Zimmermann, Jörg & Mühlenbein, Heinz, 2002. "Coordination of decisions in a spatial agent model," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 303(1), pages 189-216.
- Caridi, Inés & Ceva, Horacio, 2004. "The Minority Game with interactions," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 339(3), pages 574-582.
- Kalinowski, Thomas & Schulz, Hans-Jörg & Briese, Michael, 2000. "Cooperation in the Minority Game with local information," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 277(3), pages 502-508.
- Moelbert, S. & De Los Rios, P., 2002. "The local minority game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 303(1), pages 217-225.
- Burgos, E. & Ceva, Horacio & Perazzo, R.P.J., 2004. "The evolutionary minority game with local coordination," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 337(3), pages 635-644.
- Dorogovtsev, S.N. & Mendes, J.F.F., 2003. "Evolution of Networks: From Biological Nets to the Internet and WWW," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198515906, December.
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