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The Minority Game with interactions

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  • Caridi, Inés
  • Ceva, Horacio

Abstract

We partially modify the rules of the Minority Game (MG) by introducing some degree of local information in the game, which is only available for some agents, called the interacting agents. Our work shows that, for small values of the new parameter of the model (the fraction of interacting agents), there is an improvement of the use of the resources with respect to the MG, while as this number grows the response of the system changes, and ends up behaving worst than the usual MG.

Suggested Citation

  • Caridi, Inés & Ceva, Horacio, 2004. "The Minority Game with interactions," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 339(3), pages 574-582.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:339:y:2004:i:3:p:574-582 DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2004.03.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sebastian M. Maurer & Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, 2000. "The Competitive Dynamics Of Web Sites," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 357, Society for Computational Economics.
    2. López, Luis & A. Almendral, Juan & Sanjuán, Miguel A.F., 2003. "Complex networks and the WWW market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 324(3), pages 754-758.
    3. López, Luis & Sanjuán, Miguel A.F., 2001. "Defining strategies to win in the Internet market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 301(1), pages 512-534.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shu-Heng Chen & Umberto Gostoli, 2017. "Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(1), pages 59-93, April.
    2. Yang, Cheng & Sun, Shixin, 2007. "The minority game with incomplete strategies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 379(2), pages 645-653.
    3. Kirley, Michael, 2006. "Evolutionary minority games with small-world interactions," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 365(2), pages 521-528.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Minority game; Interacting agents; Entropy rate;

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