A model of (the threat of) counterfeiting
A simple matching-model of money with the potential for counterfeiting is constructed. In contrast to the existing literature, counterfeiting, if it occurred, would be accompanied by two distortions: costly production of counterfeits and harmful effects on trade. However, application of the Cho-Kreps refinement is shown to imply that there is no equilibrium with counterfeiting. If the cost of producing counterfeits is low enough, then there is no monetary equilibrium. Otherwise, there is a monetary equilibrium without counterfeiting.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Edward J. Green & Warren E. Weber, 1996.
"Will the new $100 bill decrease counterfeiting?,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-10.
- Stephen D. Williamson & Randall Wright, 1991.
"Barter and monetary exchange under private information,"
141, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Williamson, Steve & Wright, Randall, 1994. "Barter and Monetary Exchange under Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 104-23, March.
- Williamson, S. & Wright, R., 1991. "Barter and Monetary Exchange Under Private Information," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9107, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
- Francois R. Velde & Warren E. Weber & Randall Wright, .
"A Model of Commodity Money, With Application to Gresham's Law and the Debasement Puzzle,"
CARESS Working Papres
97-7, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- François R. Velde & Warren E. Weber & Randall Wright, 1999. "A Model of Commodity Money, with Applications to Gresham's Law and the Debasement Puzzle," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), pages 291-323, January.
- Francois R. Velde & Warren E. Weber & Randall Wright, 1997. "A model of commodity money, with applications to Gresham's law and the debasement puzzle," Staff Report 215, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Francois R. Velde & Warren E. Weber & Randall Wright, 1997. "A model of commodity money, with applications to Gresham's Law and the debasement puzzle," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues WP-97-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Manjong Lee & Neil Wallace & Tao Zhu, 2005. "Modeling Denomination Structures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(3), pages 949-960, 05.
- Shi Shougong, 1995.
"Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 467-496, December.
- Shouyong Shi, 1995. "Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining," Working Papers 916, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
896, David K. Levine.
- Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-41, February.
- Berentsen, Aleksander & Molico, Miguel & Wright, Randall, 2002.
"Indivisibilities, Lotteries, and Monetary Exchange,"
68582, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Berentsen, Aleksander & Molico, Miguel & Wright, Randall, 2002. "Indivisibilities, Lotteries, and Monetary Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 70-94, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:54:y:2007:i:4:p:994-1001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.