IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Discussion of [`]shareholder litigation and changes in disclosure behavior'


  • Lowry, Michelle


Rogers and VanBuskirk [2008. Shareholder litigation and changes in disclosure behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40, 3-73] examine changes in sued firms' disclosure policies between the pre-lawsuit and post-lawsuit periods. They find that these firms decrease the magnitude and precision of disclosures following the lawsuits. The authors conclude that managers of sued firms perceive disclosure to contribute to (rather than decrease) the probability of being sued. While the evidence showing that the magnitude and precision of disclosure decreases post-lawsuit appears to be robust, I raise some questions about what we learn from this finding.

Suggested Citation

  • Lowry, Michelle, 2009. "Discussion of [`]shareholder litigation and changes in disclosure behavior'," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1-2), pages 157-159, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:47:y:2009:i:1-2:p:157-159

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Skinner, Dj, 1994. "Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad-News," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 38-60.
    2. Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R. & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2005. "The economic implications of corporate financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 3-73, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Hanley, Kathleen Weiss & Hoberg, Gerard, 2012. "Litigation risk, strategic disclosure and the underpricing of initial public offerings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 235-254.
    2. Hassanein, Ahmed & Hussainey, Khaled, 2015. "Is forward-looking financial disclosure really informative? Evidence from UK narrative statements," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 52-61.
    3. Lin, Chen & Officer, Micah S. & Schmid, Thomas & Zou, Hong, 2019. "Is skin in the game a game changer? Evidence from mandatory changes of D&O insurance policies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1).


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:47:y:2009:i:1-2:p:157-159. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Haili He). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.