Tort law and probabilistic litigation: How to apply multipliers to address the problem of negative value suits
This article advances a proposal that increases access to justice for valuable lawsuits that are currently discouraged by litigation costs. Our proposal converts claims with negative expected values into positive expected value claims by implementing a novel system involving flexible conditional multipliers. Our proposal has two components. First, under the proposed system a plaintiff is allowed to select a damage multiplier that determines the amount of damages the plaintiff receives if the litigation is successful. Second, courts select cases for litigation randomly with a probability inverse to the multiplier selected by the plaintiff.
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