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Efficiency and fairness in minority freezeouts: Takeovers, overbidding, and the freeze-in problem

  • Maug, Ernst
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V7M-4N0XNJW-1/2/25275eb27d3829346959d58976b598e2
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 26 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 355-379

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:355-379
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle

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    1. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, 1998. "Buyouts in Large Companies," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm66, Yale School of Management.
    2. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1989. "Takeover Bids below the Expected Value of Minority Shares," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(02), pages 171-184, June.
    3. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda & Rice, Edward M, 1984. "Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 367-401, October.
    4. Rock, Kevin, 1986. "Why new issues are underpriced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 187-212.
    5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1994. "Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 4788, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, 1988. "Successful Takeovers without Exclusion," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 89-110.
    7. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1998. "Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 172-204, February.
    8. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr & Prokop, Jacek, 1993. "The Dynamics of the Free-Rider Problem in Takeovers," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 851-82.
    9. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    10. Kahan, Marcel, 1993. "Sales of Corporate Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 368-79, October.
    11. Armo Gomes, 2001. "Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage," Penn CARESS Working Papers c4679b705ea88aebda985c6da, Penn Economics Department.
    12. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 253-70, May.
    13. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
    14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Nalebuff, Barry, 1992. "To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free-Rider Problem," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 37-62, Spring.
    15. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    16. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Goshen, Zohar & Wiener, Zvi, 2000. "The Value of the Freezeout Option," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt4ts4k8gc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    18. Yakov Amihud & Marcel Kahan & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, 2004. "The Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1325-1344, 06.
    19. Hirshleifer, David & Titman, Sheridan, 1990. "Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 295-324, April.
    20. Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-76, October.
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