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Efficiency and fairness in minority freezeouts: Takeovers, overbidding, and the freeze-in problem

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  • Maug, Ernst

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  • Maug, Ernst, 2006. "Efficiency and fairness in minority freezeouts: Takeovers, overbidding, and the freeze-in problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 355-379, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:355-379
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    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
    2. Hermalin, Benjamin & Schwartz, Alan, 1996. "Buyouts in Large Companies," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 351-370, June.
    3. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    4. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    6. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr & Prokop, Jacek, 1993. "The Dynamics of the Free-Rider Problem in Takeovers," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 851-882.
    7. Hirshleifer, David & Titman, Sheridan, 1990. "Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 295-324, April.
    8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1994. "Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 957-993.
    9. Kahan, Marcel, 1993. "Sales of Corporate Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 368-379, October.
    10. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 253-270, May.
    11. Goshen, Zohar & Wiener, Zvi, 2000. "The Value of the Freezeout Option," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt4ts4k8gc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    12. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1998. "Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 172-204, February.
    13. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1989. "Takeover Bids below the Expected Value of Minority Shares," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(02), pages 171-184, June.
    14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Nalebuff, Barry, 1992. "To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free-Rider Problem," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 37-62, Spring.
    15. Armo Gomes, 2001. "Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage," Penn CARESS Working Papers c4679b705ea88aebda985c6da, Penn Economics Department.
    16. Yakov Amihud & Marcel Kahan & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, 2004. "The Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1325-1344, June.
    17. Rock, Kevin, 1986. "Why new issues are underpriced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 187-212.
    18. Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-376, October.
    19. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda & Rice, Edward M, 1984. "Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 367-401, October.
    20. Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, 1988. "Successful Takeovers without Exclusion," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 89-110.
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    1. repec:mul:jdp901:doi:10.12831/73633:y:2013:i:1:p:51-65 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. At, Christian & Béal, Sylvain & Morand, Pierre-Henri, 2015. "Freezeout, compensation rules, and voting equilibria," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 91-102.
    3. Clerc, Christophe & Demarigny, Fabrice & Valiante, Diego & de Manuel, Mirzha, 2012. "A Legal and Economic Assessment of European Takeover Regulation," CEPS Papers 7525, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    4. Bazzana Flavio & Broccardo Eleonora, 2013. "The role of bondholder coordination in freeze-out exchange offers," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 67-84, January.
    5. Bøhren, Øyvind & Krosvik, Nils Erik, 2013. "The economics of minority freezeouts: Evidence from the courtroom," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 48-58.
    6. Brada, Josef C., 2016. "Corporate governance following mass privatization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 1132-1144.

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