Reexamining the effect of the most-favored-nation provision in input prices on R and D incentives
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- Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso, 2003.
"Investments and Network Competition,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3829, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Valletti, Tommaso M., 2003.
"Input price discrimination with downstream Cournot competitors,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 969-988, September.
- Valletti, Tommaso, 2002. "Input Price Discrimination with Downstream Cournot Competitors," CEPR Discussion Papers 3570, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- DeGraba, Patrick, 1990. "Input Market Price Discrimination and the Choice of Technology," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1246-53, December.
- Gans, Joshua S, 2001. "Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Pricing for Access to Essential Facilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 167-89, September.
- Jeong-Yoo Kim & Yoonsung Lim, 2004. "The Revenue-Sharing Rule For Interconnection Charges," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(3), pages 298-310.
- Yoshihiro Yoshida, 2000. "Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Output and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 240-246, March.
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