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Internal organization and managerial compensation in oligopoly

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  • Gal-Or, Esther

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  • Gal-Or, Esther, 1993. "Internal organization and managerial compensation in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 157-183, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:11:y:1993:i:2:p:157-183
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    Cited by:

    1. Barros, Fatima, 1997. "Asymmetric information as a commitment in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 207-225, February.
    2. Jost, Peter-J., 2011. "Joint ventures in patent contests with spillovers and the role of strategic budgeting," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 605-637.
    3. Koji Ishibashi, 2010. "Effects Of Asymmetric Information Within A Firm On Oligopolistic Market Outcomes," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 488-506, December.
    4. Gal-Or, Esther, 1995. "Departmentalization and stochastic dissimilarity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 293-317, February.
    5. Senbongi, Shuichi & Harrington, Joseph E., 1995. "Managerial reputation and the competitiveness of an industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 95-110, March.
    6. Barros, Fatima, 1995. "Incentive schemes as strategic variables: An application to a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 373-386, September.
    7. Esther Gal‐Or, 1997. "Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 235-256, June.
    8. Carlos Barcena-Ruiz, Juan & Paz Espinosa, Maria, 1999. "Should multiproduct firms provide divisional or corporate incentives?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 751-764, July.
    9. Fátima Barros & Inés Macho‐Stadler, 1998. "Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 89-103, March.
    10. Michel Cavagnac, 2005. "Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(8), pages 499-512.

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