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Effect of incentive payments on chronic disease management and health services use in British Columbia, Canada: Interrupted time series analysis

Author

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  • Lavergne, M. Ruth
  • Law, Michael R.
  • Peterson, Sandra
  • Garrison, Scott
  • Hurley, Jeremiah
  • Cheng, Lucy
  • McGrail, Kimberlyn

Abstract

We studied the effects of incentive payments to primary care physicians for the care of patients with diabetes, hypertension, and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) in British Columbia, Canada. We used linked administrative health data to examine monthly primary care visits, continuity of care, laboratory testing, pharmaceutical dispensing, hospitalizations, and total h ealth care spending. We examined periods two years before and two years after each incentive was introduced, and used segmented regression to assess whether there were changes in level or trend of outcome measures across all eligible patients following incentive introduction, relative to pre-intervention periods. We observed no increases in primary care visits or continuity of care after incentives were introduced. Rates of ACR testing and antihypertensive dispensing increased among patients with hypertension, but none of the other modest increases in laboratory testing or prescriptions dispensed reached statistical significance. Rates of hospitalizations for stroke and heart failure among patients with hypertension fell relative to pre-intervention patterns, while hospitalizations for COPD increased. Total hospitalizations and hospitalizations via the emergency department did not change. Health care spending increased for patients with hypertension. This large-scale incentive scheme for primary care physicians showed some positive effects for patients with hypertension, but we observe no similar changes in patient management, reductions in hospitalizations, or changes in spending for patients with diabetes and COPD.

Suggested Citation

  • Lavergne, M. Ruth & Law, Michael R. & Peterson, Sandra & Garrison, Scott & Hurley, Jeremiah & Cheng, Lucy & McGrail, Kimberlyn, 2018. "Effect of incentive payments on chronic disease management and health services use in British Columbia, Canada: Interrupted time series analysis," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 157-164.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:122:y:2018:i:2:p:157-164
    DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.11.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin Emmert & Frank Eijkenaar & Heike Kemter & Adelheid Esslinger & Oliver Schöffski, 2012. "Economic evaluation of pay-for-performance in health care: a systematic review," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 13(6), pages 755-767, December.
    2. Jinhu Li & Jeremiah Hurley & Philip DeCicca & Gioia Buckley, 2014. "Physician Response To Pay‐For‐Performance: Evidence From A Natural Experiment," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(8), pages 962-978, August.
    3. Eijkenaar, Frank & Emmert, Martin & Scheppach, Manfred & Schöffski, Oliver, 2013. "Effects of pay for performance in health care: A systematic review of systematic reviews," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 115-130.
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    Cited by:

    1. da Luz Pereira, António & Ramalho, André & Viana, João & Pinto Hespanhol, Alberto & Freitas, Alberto & Biscaia, André, 2021. "The effect of commissioning on Portuguese Primary Health Care units’ performance: A four-year national analysis," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(6), pages 709-716.
    2. McKay, Madeleine & Lavergne, M. Ruth & Lea, Amanda Prince & Le, Michael & Grudniewicz, Agnes & Blackie, Doug & Goldsmith, Laurie J. & Marshall, Emily Gard & Mathews, Maria & McCracken, Rita & McGrail,, 2022. "Government policies targeting primary care physician practice from 1998-2018 in three Canadian provinces: A jurisdictional scan," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(6), pages 565-575.
    3. Thaksha Thavam & Rose Anne Devlin & Amardeep Thind & Gregory S. Zaric & Sisira Sarma, 2020. "The impact of the diabetes management incentive on diabetes-related services: evidence from Ontario, Canada," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 21(9), pages 1279-1293, December.
    4. Sahar Saeed & Erica E. M. Moodie & Erin C. Strumpf & Marina B. Klein, 2018. "Segmented generalized mixed effect models to evaluate health outcomes," International Journal of Public Health, Springer;Swiss School of Public Health (SSPH+), vol. 63(4), pages 547-551, May.

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