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Set-valued cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs. The fuzzy assignment game

  • Monroy, L.
  • Hinojosa, M.A.
  • Mármol, A.M.
  • Fernández, F.R.
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    In this paper we study cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs. The main advantage of the approach presented is the incorporation into the analysis of the problem of ambiguity inherent in many real-world collective decision situations. We propose extensions of core concepts which maintain the fuzzy nature of allocations, and lead to a more satisfactory study of the problem within the fuzzy context. Finally, we illustrate the extended core concepts and the approach to obtain the corresponding allocations through the analysis of assignment games with uncertain profits.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Operational Research.

    Volume (Year): 225 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 85-90

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:225:y:2013:i:1:p:85-90
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    1. Fernandez, F. R. & Hinojosa, M. A. & Puerto, J., 2004. "Set-valued TU-games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 159(1), pages 181-195, November.
    2. Suijs, J.P.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Tijs, S.H., 1995. "Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs," Discussion Paper 1995-88, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. A Emrouznejad & M Zerafat Angiz L & W Ho, 2012. "An alternative formulation for the fuzzy assignment problem," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 63(1), pages 59-63, January.
    4. Fernandez, Francisco R. & Hinojosa, Miguel A. & Puerto, Justo, 2004. "Multi-criteria minimum cost spanning tree games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 158(2), pages 399-408, October.
    5. Daniel Granot, 1977. "Cooperative Games in Stochastic Characteristic Function Form," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(6), pages 621-630, February.
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