Deposit games with reinvestment
In a deposit game coalitions are formed by players combining their capital. The proceeds of their investments then have to be divided among those players. The current model extends earlier work on capital deposits by allowing reinvestment of returns. Two specific subclasses of deposit games are introduced. These subclasses provide insight in two extreme cases. It is seen that each term dependent deposit game possesses a core element. Capital dependent deposit games are also shown to have a core element and even a population monotonic allocation scheme if the revenue function exhibits increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, it is shown that all superadditive games are deposit games if one allows for debt.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Borm, P.E.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Rafels, C. & Suijs, J.P.M. & Tijs, S.H. & Timmer, J.B., 2001.
"Cooperation in capital deposits,"
Other publications TiSEM
de31df8b-638a-43b2-b79e-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- repec:tiu:tiutis:9192543e-378d-4f59-aac6-bbc3200b0dcb is not listed on IDEAS
- Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
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