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Deposit games with reinvestment

Author

Listed:
  • van Gulick, Gerwald
  • Borm, Peter
  • De Waegenaere, Anja
  • Hendrickx, Ruud

Abstract

In a deposit game coalitions are formed by players combining their capital. The proceeds of their investments then have to be divided among those players. The current model extends earlier work on capital deposits by allowing reinvestment of returns. Two specific subclasses of deposit games are introduced. These subclasses provide insight in two extreme cases. It is seen that each term dependent deposit game possesses a core element. Capital dependent deposit games are also shown to have a core element and even a population monotonic allocation scheme if the revenue function exhibits increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, it is shown that all superadditive games are deposit games if one allows for debt.

Suggested Citation

  • van Gulick, Gerwald & Borm, Peter & De Waegenaere, Anja & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2010. "Deposit games with reinvestment," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 200(3), pages 788-799, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:200:y:2010:i:3:p:788-799
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Borm, P.E.M. & De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Rafels, C. & Suijs, J.P.M. & Tijs, S.H. & Timmer, J.B., 1999. "Cooperation in Capital Deposits," Discussion Paper 1999-31, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. repec:tiu:tiutis:9192543e-378d-4f59-aac6-bbc3200b0dcb is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gerwald Gulick & Henk Norde, 2013. "Fuzzy cores and fuzzy balancedness," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 77(2), pages 131-146, April.
    2. repec:spr:compst:v:77:y:2013:i:2:p:131-146 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative game theory Deposit games Core elements Population monotonic allocation schemes Superadditive games;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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