IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v219y2022ics0165176522002944.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Differentiated-products Cournot attributes higher markups than Bertrand–Nash

Author

Listed:
  • Magnolfi, Lorenzo
  • Quint, Daniel
  • Sullivan, Christopher
  • Waldfogel, Sarah

Abstract

In a differentiated products setting when costs are unobserved, the Cournot model of quantity-setting competition attributes a greater share of prices to markups than does the Bertrand–Nash model of price-setting, leading to lower estimates of marginal costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Magnolfi, Lorenzo & Quint, Daniel & Sullivan, Christopher & Waldfogel, Sarah, 2022. "Differentiated-products Cournot attributes higher markups than Bertrand–Nash," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:219:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002944
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110804
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176522002944
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110804?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hathaway, Neville J. & Rickard, John A., 1979. "Equilibria of price-setting and quantity-setting duopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 133-137.
    2. Okuguchi, Koji, 1987. "Equilibrium prices in the Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 128-139, June.
    3. Amir, Rabah & Jin, Jim Y., 2001. "Cournot and Bertrand equilibria compared: substitutability, complementarity and concavity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 303-317, March.
    4. Leonard Cheng, 1985. "Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria: A Geometric Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 146-152, Spring.
    5. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    6. Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-890, July.
    7. Vives, Xavier, 1985. "On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 166-175, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:ags:aaea22:335854 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Furth, D., 2007. "Anything goes with heterogeneous, but not with homogeneous oligopoly," CeNDEF Working Papers 07-12, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    2. Amr Farahat & Georgia Perakis, 2011. "TECHNICAL NOTE---A Comparison of Bertrand and Cournot Profits in Oligopolies with Differentiated Products," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 507-513, April.
    3. Xiaoming Yan & Yong Wang & Zhaofu Hong, 2016. "Comparison of Bertrand and Cournot competitions under random yield," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(11), pages 3256-3276, June.
    4. Banerjee, Dyuti S. & Chatterjee, Ishita, 2014. "Exploring Stackelberg profit ordering under asymmetric product differentiation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 309-315.
    5. Aymeric Lardon, 2019. "On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(4), pages 421-449, November.
    6. Ki‐Dong Lee & Sunghee Choi & Kangsik Choi, 2020. "Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 101-120, April.
    7. M. Breton & A. Turki & G. Zaccour, 2004. "Dynamic Model of R&D, Spillovers, and Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 1-25, October.
    8. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2015. "On the Cournot–Bertrand Profit Differential and the Structure of Unionisation in a Managerial Duopoly," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 266-287, December.
    9. Alipranti, Maria & Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2014. "Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 122-126.
    10. Furth, Dave, 2009. "Anything goes with heterogeneous, but not always with homogeneous oligopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 183-203, January.
    11. Lofaro, Andrea, 2002. "On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot competition under incomplete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 561-578, September.
    12. Arghya Ghosh & Manipushpak Mitra, 2008. "Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Outcomes in the Presence of Public Firms," Discussion Papers 2008-18, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    13. Delbono, Flavio & Lambertini, Luca, 2016. "Ranking Bertrand, Cournot and supply function equilibria in oligopoly," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 73-78.
    14. Manipushpak Mitra & Rupayan Pal & Arindam Paul & P. M. Sharada, 2020. "Equilibrium Coexistence of Public and Private Firms and the Plausibility of Price Competition," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(2), pages 217-242.
    15. Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 181-191, November.
    16. Mónica Correa‐López, 2007. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Upstream Suppliers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 469-505, June.
    17. Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, 2015. "Nature of Competition and New Technology Adoption," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 696-732, December.
    18. Rupayan Pal, "undated". "The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: A Reversal result in network goods duopoly," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-014, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    19. Troy Tassier, 2013. "Handbook of Research on Complexity, by J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. and Edward Elgar," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 39(1), pages 132-133.
    20. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Yunshyong Chow & Shi-Miin Liu, 2024. "Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand Firms: Exploring Imitation and Replicator Processes," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 1057-1092, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot competition; Bertrand competition; Markups;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:219:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002944. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.