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Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions

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  • Cox, James C.
  • Smith, Vernon L.
  • Walker, James M.

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  • Cox, James C. & Smith, Vernon L. & Walker, James M., 1983. "Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(3-4), pages 207-212.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:12:y:1983:i:3-4:p:207-212
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    2. Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Sarah Taylor & Neslihan Uler, 2012. "Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(2), pages 159-173, September.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Weber, Roberto A., 2000. "The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 x 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 523-548, August.
    4. Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 808-830, September.
    5. Olivier Armantier & Nicolas Treich, 2006. "Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-15, CIRANO.
    6. Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 183-204, January.
    7. Tibor Neugebauer & Reinhard Selten, 2002. "Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
    8. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "The overbidding-myth and the underbidding-bias in first-price auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-32, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    9. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2005. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 703-741, August.
    10. repec:eee:ejores:v:261:y:2017:i:3:p:994-1000 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0583-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2005. "Theory And Misbehavior Of First-Price Auctions: The Importance Of Information Feedback In Experimental Markets," Experimental 0503008, EconWPA.

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