Environmental regulation of technically inefficient firms
This paper presents a model in which a technically inefficient firm is responsible for the emissions of pollutants. We derive second-best regulatory schemes (tax and quota) assuming that the firm’s technical efficiency is unknown to the regulator.
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- Richmond, J, 1974. "Estimating the Efficiency of Production," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(2), pages 515-21, June.
- Muller Nicholas Z, 2011. "Linking Policy to Statistical Uncertainty in Air Pollution Damages," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-29, June.
- Afriat, Sidney N, 1972. "Efficiency Estimation of Production Function," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(3), pages 568-98, October.
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"Prices vs. Quantities,"
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Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 477-91, October.
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