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Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm

  • Kumano, Taro
  • Watabe, Masahiro

We examine all dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm. Under substitutable and quota-filling choice functions, we show how untruthful dominant strategies look like. Our finding leads to the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome despite the possibility of multiple equilibria.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 112 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 135-137

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:135-137
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  1. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
  2. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
  3. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
  4. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
  5. Ahmet Alkan, 2001. "original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 99-111.
  6. Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2007. "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
  7. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2007. "Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 307-325, August.
  8. Rafael Repullo, 1985. "Implementation in Dominant Strategies under Complete and Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 223-229.
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