Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
We examine all dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm. Under substitutable and quota-filling choice functions, we show how untruthful dominant strategies look like. Our finding leads to the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome despite the possibility of multiple equilibria.
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