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Backdating executive stock options--An ex ante valuation

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  • Eikseth, Hans Marius
  • Lindset, Snorre

Abstract

When backdating executive stock options (ESOs), the exercise price is set in favor of the recipient executive. Relative to a non-backdated benchmark, we find an (ex ante) upper bound for the cost of backdating to shrink from 10% to about 3.7%, as a consequence of the regime change represented by the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX). We frame the backdating behavior as a (compound) exotic option, considering both simple and extended models of the underlying ESO--in the latter case we draw on the analytical ESO models of Sircar and Xiong (2007). Post-SOX, we use a Longstaff-Schwartz inspired least squares Monte Carlo approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Eikseth, Hans Marius & Lindset, Snorre, 2011. "Backdating executive stock options--An ex ante valuation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 1731-1743, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:10:p:1731-1743
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Guthrie, Graeme & Stannard, Tom, 2020. "Easy money? Managerial power and the option backdating game revisited," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).

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