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The effect of organised hypocrisy: Compensation committees and fair compensation in the Ghanaian mining industry

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  • Uche, Chinyere
  • Khalid, Sharif

Abstract

Compensation committees are established by mining companies to negotiate fair compensation on behalf of farmers. However, prior studies suggest that compensation packages are considered unfair by farmers. The failure of compensation committees to deliver fair compensation can signal inconsistencies between espoused ideals and action. The aim of this study is to explore how compensation committees are implicated in inconsistencies between talk, decisions, and actions which undermine fair compensation as well as the effect of such inconsistencies on mining companies. We rely on data collected from a mix of qualitative interviews with various stakeholders and secondary documents. Drawing on the theory of organised hypocrisy, the findings suggests that mining companies use inconsistencies between talk, decisions, and action with respect to compensation committees to facilitate, manage and defend unfair compensation. We contribute to studies on organised hypocrisy in revealing four effects of organised hypocrisy. Namely, organised hypocrisy can be a source of dysfunction, function, aid, and pose a threat to legitimacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Uche, Chinyere & Khalid, Sharif, 2023. "The effect of organised hypocrisy: Compensation committees and fair compensation in the Ghanaian mining industry," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:crpeac:v:95:y:2023:i:c:s1045235422000946
    DOI: 10.1016/j.cpa.2022.102509
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Warren Maroun, 2018. "Accounting for Strike Action: An Illustration of Organised Hypocrisy," Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 167-196, September.
    2. Anderson, Ronald C. & Bizjak, John M., 2003. "An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1323-1348, July.
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