IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/chsofr/v199y2025ip1s0960077925006046.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The impact of tax-based rewards and mercenary punishment on public goods games

Author

Listed:
  • Shen, Yong
  • Deng, Zixuan
  • Kang, Hongwei
  • Sun, Xingping
  • Chen, Qingyi

Abstract

Punishments and rewards have long been an inseparable topic in public goods cooperation, but both punishments and rewards will face expensive costs. So how to better apply rewards and punishments is a focal point in the evolution of cooperation. It is widely recognized that punishments tend to be more effective than rewards, but in recent years research has found that pure rewards based on taxes lead to higher levels of cooperation than pure punishments based on taxes. This paper examines the effect of the manner and object of rewards on the public goods game on the basis of taxation. It is found that rewards are more likely to enhance cooperation when they are used directly to increase the gains of cooperators than when they are used to support the survival of a third strategy. And in models that combine rewards and punishments, the use of rewards to support the survival of the third strategy may reduce the effect of the original punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Shen, Yong & Deng, Zixuan & Kang, Hongwei & Sun, Xingping & Chen, Qingyi, 2025. "The impact of tax-based rewards and mercenary punishment on public goods games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 199(P1).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:199:y:2025:i:p1:s0960077925006046
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116591
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077925006046
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116591?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:199:y:2025:i:p1:s0960077925006046. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thayer, Thomas R. (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/chaos-solitons-and-fractals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.