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CEO managerial ability and the marginal value of cash

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  • Gan, Huiqi
  • Park, Myung S.

Abstract

This study examines whether the managerial ability of a chief executive officer (CEO) is associated with a marginal value of cash. We predict that more talented CEOs make better use of cash, creating the marginal value of cash. Using the managerial ability measures of Demerjian et al. (2012) and the cash value model developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006), we find that CEO managerial ability significantly increases the marginal value of cash. We also find that the effect of managerial ability on the marginal value of cash is generally greater for financially constrained firms. We further show that that the positive impact of managerial ability on the marginal value of cash is more evident for firms with higher levels of free cash flows and lower management entrenchment. Overall, our findings suggest that the market places a higher value on cash if the cash is managed by more able CEOs, which is consistent with the view that shareholders consider the ability of a CEO when they evaluate cash.

Suggested Citation

  • Gan, Huiqi & Park, Myung S., 2017. "CEO managerial ability and the marginal value of cash," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 126-135.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:advacc:v:38:y:2017:i:c:p:126-135
    DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2017.07.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeon, Chunmi & Mun, Seongjae & Han, Seung Hun, 2022. "Firm-level political risk, liquidity management, and managerial attributes," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Efstathios Magerakis & Ahsan Habib, 2022. "Environmental uncertainty and corporate cash holdings: The moderating role of CEO ability," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 402-432, September.
    3. Samuel Jebaraj Benjamin, 2019. "The Effect of Financial Constraints on Audit Fees," Capital Markets Review, Malaysian Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 59-87.
    4. Xueyan Dong & Kam C. Chan & Yujia Cui & Jenny Xinjiao Guan, 2021. "Strategic deviance and cash holdings," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3-4), pages 742-782, March.
    5. Puspita Ghaniy Anggraini & Mahfud Sholihin, 2023. "What do we know about managerial ability? A systematic literature review," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30, February.
    6. Lin, Fengyi & Lin, Sheng-Wei & Fang, Wen-Chang, 2020. "How CEO narcissism affects earnings management behaviors," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).

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