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Persistent Court Corruption

  • Philip Bond
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    Corruption among court officials varies widely across countries and exhibits considerable intertemporal persistence. I present a model of court corruption in which there are multiple equilibria, differentiated by corruption levels. In the model, courts provide incentives for individuals to take/abstain from certain actions. High corruption levels undermine incentive provision and necessitate larger penalties. Larger penalties in turn increase the potential bribes that a court official can collect and so attract more dishonest officials to court employment. This feedback effect generates multiple equilibria. Paying court officials wages sufficiently above the market-clearing rate can eliminate the high corruption equilibrium. Copyright (C) The Author(s). Journal compilation (C) Royal Economic Society 2008.

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    Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

    Volume (Year): 118 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 531 (08)
    Pages: 1333-1353

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    Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:118:y:2008:i:531:p:1333-1353
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