Private Information and Altruism in Bidding Roscas
This article studies how altruism improves allocations in a private information environment where strategic behaviour reduces economic welfare. A theoretical analysis establishes that, in an environment characterised by uncertainty and private information, outcomes of auctions in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (Roscas) are more efficient when bidders' preferences are altruistic rather than selfish. A semi-parametric structural estimation technique for Rosca auctions is presented. A parametric structural estimation identifies interactions between group characteristics and bidder altruism. It is found that effective leadership and intra-group diversity are associated with a greater extent of bidder altruism and thus more efficient intra-Rosca allocations. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s).
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Volume (Year): 118 (2008)
Issue (Month): 528 (04)
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