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Super-majorites and collective surplus in one-dimensional bargaining: Numerical simulations

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Cardona

    (Universitat de les Illes Balears and CREB)

  • Clara Ponsatí

    (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica - CSIC)

Abstract

This note presents numerical simulations computing quota rules that maximize collective surplus for populations choosing a one-dimensional policy through bargaining and voting. These computations are based on the characterization of the unique (asymptotic) equilibrium of Cardona and Ponsatí (2011). We show that under quadratic utility functions, the unique quota rule that maximizes collective surplus ranges from 80% to 95%.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsatí, 2013. "Super-majorites and collective surplus in one-dimensional bargaining: Numerical simulations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 278-288.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00741
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsatí, 2014. "Super-Majorites, One-Dimensional Policies, and Social Surplus," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(6), pages 884-898, December.
    2. Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2011. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 65-75, September.
    3. Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 73-88, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    One-dimensional bargaining; single-peak preferences; quota rules; collective surplus.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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