IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-11-00813.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Symmetry vs. complexity in proving the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Uuganbaatar Ninjbat

    () (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

In this short note, we first provide two rather straightforward proofs for the Muller - Satterthwaite theorem in the baseline cases of 2 person 3 alternatives, and 2 person n ≥ 3 alternatives. We also show that it suffices to prove the result in the special case of 3 alternatives (with arbitrary N individuals) as it then can easily be extended to the general case. We then prove the result in the decisive case of 3 alternatives (with arbitrary N individuals) by induction on N.

Suggested Citation

  • Uuganbaatar Ninjbat, 2012. "Symmetry vs. complexity in proving the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1434-1441.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00813
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I2-P137.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    2. Miller, Michael K., 2009. "Social choice theory without Pareto: The pivotal voter approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 251-255, September.
    3. Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2013. "The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 41-63, January.
    4. Vohra,Rakesh V., 2011. "Mechanism Design," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521179461, March.
    5. Vohra,Rakesh V., 2011. "Mechanism Design," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107004368, March.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem; Monotone social choice functions;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00813. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.