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Bogotá, El Colapso de una Maquinaria Política

Author

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  • Rafael José Santos Villagran

    (Universidad de los Andes. Colombia.)

Abstract

En Bogotá las reformas de 1991 obstruyeron un mercado de compra y venta de votos. El clientelismo perdió efectividad, los ciudadanos desarrollaron un voto de opinión y la ciudad demostró un desempeño sobresaliente en la provisión de bienes y servicios públicos. Esta historia se ilustra mediante un novedoso panel con datos a nivel del barrio y del puesto de votación desde 1988 hasta 2003. Un episodio interesante expone las preferencias de clase de los bogotanos por cada uno de sus alcaldes. Sin embargo, el resultado principal es el quiebre estructural ocasionado por las reformas. Antes de 1991, las zonas más expuestas al clientelismo generaban un mayor porcentaje de votos por los partidos tradicionales y obtenían una mayor cobertura en servicios públicos; después de 1991, ambas relaciones dejan de ser ciertas. Una maquinaria clientelista colapsa.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael José Santos Villagran, 2007. "Bogotá, El Colapso de una Maquinaria Política," Economic Analysis Working Papers (2002-2010). Atlantic Review of Economics (2011-2016), Colexio de Economistas de A Coruña, Spain and Fundación Una Galicia Moderna, vol. 6, pages 1-28, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eac:articl:13/06
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Miguel Urrutia, 1991. "On the Absence of Economic Populism in Colombia," NBER Chapters, in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 369-391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    3. Leonard Wantchekon, 2003. "Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in benin," Natural Field Experiments 00339, The Field Experiments Website.
    4. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
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