A Strategic Analysis of Corners and Squeezes
We develop a dynamic game-theoretic model of a futures market in which prices can be manipulated by corner and squeeze. We investigate equilibrium trading strategies and the price dynamics these strategies produce. Price paths produced by our model can mimic observed prices for potentially comerable commodities and explain the volatility of certain prices even when no manipulations occur. Our model also generates occasional apparent price bubbles and accounts for the existence of normal backwardation in futures markets even when players are risk neutral.
Volume (Year): 33 (1998)
Issue (Month): 01 (March)
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