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Individual versus Group Play in the Repeated Coordinated Resistance Game

Listed author(s):
  • Cason, Timothy N.
  • Mui, Vai-Lam

This paper reports an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of repeated interactions in deterring leaders’ from using divide-and-conquer strategies to extract surplus from their subordinates, when every decision-maker involved is a group instead of an individual. We find that both the resistance rate by subordinates and the divide-and-conquer transgression rate by leaders are the same in the group and individual repeated coordinated resistance games. Similar to the individual game, adding communication to the group game can help deter opportunistic behavior by the leaders even in the presence of repetition.
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Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Journal of Experimental Political Science.

Volume (Year): 2 (2015)
Issue (Month): 01 (March)
Pages: 94-106

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Handle: RePEc:cup:jexpos:v:2:y:2015:i:01:p:94-106_00
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  1. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2010. "Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 420-447, March.
  2. Müller, Wieland & Tan, Fangfang, 2013. "Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 658-674.
  3. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2011. "Rent seeking in groups," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 116-125, January.
  4. Bornstein, Gary & Kugler, Tamar & Budescu, David V. & Selten, Reinhard, 2008. "Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 808-821, June.
  5. John H. Kagel & Peter McGee, 2016. "Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 253-276, May.
  6. John A. List & Michael K. Price (ed.), 2013. "Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12964.
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