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Understanding the Role of Political Staff and Parliamentary Administrations

Author

Listed:
  • Gijs Jan Brandsma

    (Institute of Management Research, Radboud University, The Netherlands)

  • Anna-Lena Högenauer

    (Department of Social Sciences, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg)

Abstract

The staff working in parliaments represent a highly relevant, yet significantly understudied group of actors. While political scientists have sought to understand the activities of elected representatives in parliaments, the role of the administration and political staff is understudied. However, the sparse case studies that exist underscore the key role played by political staff in brokering information, advising, preparing and exercising legislative oversight, preparing and in part conducting legislative compromise-seeking, and interacting with various actors such as lobby groups, citizens, and the media. Yet, such roles may well vary between political systems. In addition, some staff later pursue a political career, further blurring the lines between politics and administration. This issue seeks to provide cutting-edge research in this emerging field, bridging the disciplines of political science and public administration.

Suggested Citation

  • Gijs Jan Brandsma & Anna-Lena Högenauer, 2026. "Understanding the Role of Political Staff and Parliamentary Administrations," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 14.
  • Handle: RePEc:cog:poango:v14:y:2026:a:11511
    DOI: 10.17645/pag.11511
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. HUBER, JOHN D. & McCARTY, NOLAN, 2004. "Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 481-494, August.
    2. Meagan Cloutier, 2026. "Echoes and Barriers: Staff as Key Actors in the Representative Process," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 14.
    3. Anna-Lena Högenauer & Christine Neuhold, 2026. "From Advisor to Interparliamentary Networker: A Typology of Parliamentary Officials in EU Affairs," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 14.
    4. Henriette Heimbach, 2026. "Working Behind the Scenes: Roles and Functions of French and German Parliamentary Staff," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 14.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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