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Reviewing Procedure vs. Judging Substance: How Increasing Bureaucratic Oversight Can Reduce Bureaucratic Accountability

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  • Turner, Ian R

    (Yale University)

Abstract

How does the scope of review affect bureaucratic policymaking? To explore this question, I consider a policymaking environment in which an expert agency develops policy that is upheld or overturned by an overseer who may have different policy goals. The agency can affect the quality of implementation through effort investments in addition to choosing the substantive content of policy. Under procedural review the overseer only reviews the agency’s effort, which allows the agency to fully utilize its expertise. Substantive review also tasks the overseer with judging agencies’ substantive policy choices, which can lead the agency to disregard its superior information and obfuscate to avoid reversal. Depending on the policy environment, this dynamic can either benefit or harm the overseer. In some cases the overseer can be made better off by having less transparent review institutions; that is, institutions that direct the overseer to only review procedure and preclude judging substance.

Suggested Citation

  • Turner, Ian R, 2021. "Reviewing Procedure vs. Judging Substance: How Increasing Bureaucratic Oversight Can Reduce Bureaucratic Accountability," SocArXiv v6kzw, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:v6kzw
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/v6kzw
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bawn, Kathleen, 1995. "Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 62-73, March.
    2. HUBER, JOHN D. & McCARTY, NOLAN, 2004. "Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 481-494, August.
    3. Gailmard, Sean, 2009. "Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Control Bureaucratic Policy Making," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 25-44, January.
    4. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2007. "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 873-889, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patty, John & Turner, Ian R, 2024. "Strange Bedfellows: How the Need for Good Governance Shapes Budgetary Control of Bureaucracy," OSF Preprints pnx2u, Center for Open Science.

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