IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v35y2002i1p16-35.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal early action on greenhouse gas emissions

Author

Listed:
  • Peter W. Kennedy

Abstract

In this paper I argue that early action policies that focus on early actual emission reductions will tend to distort abatement investment decisions and thereby inflate the national compliance cost of a greenhouse gas emissions reduction target. Compliance cost savings stem from well-planned early action that may or may not yield early actual emission reductions. Thus, policies that target actual emission reductions, such as "credit for early action" or an aggressive, early "cap-and-trade" program, have the potential to be highly distorting. Simulation results from a model calibrated to the Canadian economy suggest that the associated welfare losses could be many billions of dollars.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter W. Kennedy, 2002. "Optimal early action on greenhouse gas emissions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 35(1), pages 16-35, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:35:y:2002:i:1:p:16-35
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5982.00118
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5982.00118
    Download Restriction: access restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1540-5982.00118?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. G. Cornelis van Kooten, 2003. "Smoke and Mirrors: The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(4), pages 397-415, December.
    2. Chevallier, Julien & Etner, Johanna & Jouvet, Pierre-André, 2011. "Bankable emission permits under uncertainty and optimal risk-management rules," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 332-339, December.
    3. Lambertini, Luca & Pignataro, Giuseppe & Tampieri, Alessandro, 2020. "The effects of environmental quality misperception on investments and regulation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    4. Di Maria, Corrado & Smulders, Sjak & van der Werf, Edwin, 2012. "Absolute abundance and relative scarcity: Environmental policy with implementation lags," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 104-119.
    5. Jus Darko & Meier Volker, 2015. "Announcing is Bad, Delaying is Worse: Another Pitfall in Well-intended Climate Policy," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(3), pages 286-297, June.
    6. Keith Brouhle & Donna Ramirez Harrington, 2009. "Firm strategy and the Canadian Voluntary Climate Challenge and Registry (VCR)," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(6), pages 360-379, September.
    7. Sjak Smulders & Edwin van der Werf, 2008. "Climate policy and the optimal extraction of high- and low-carbon fossil fuels," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1421-1444, November.
    8. Wang, Mingxi & Wang, Mingrong & Wang, Shouyang, 2012. "Optimal investment and uncertainty on China's carbon emission abatement," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 871-877.
    9. Corrado Di Maria & Sjak Smulders & Edwin van der Werf, 2008. "Absolute Abundance and Relative Scarcity: Announced Policy, Resource Extraction, and Carbon Emissions," Working Papers 2008.92, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Kim, Eun-Hee & Lyon, Thomas P., 2011. "Strategic environmental disclosure: Evidence from the DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas registry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 311-326, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:35:y:2002:i:1:p:16-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.