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International Effects of Government Expenditure in Interdependent Economies

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  • Marcelo Bianconi
  • Stephen J. Turnovsky

Abstract

A dynamic analysis of the international transmission of government expenditure shocks under alternative methods of finance is presented. The benchmark case of lump-sum tax financing yields an expansion in both the short-run and the long-run levels of domestic activity, while crowding out domestic consumption. Activity abroad declines in the short run and, while it is stimulated during the transition, long-run activity abroad also declines. With capital income tax financing, the accompanying distortion outweighs the direct expenditure effects, so that all these responses are reversed. Financing with a tax on labor produces ambiguous responses. The welfare implications of these policies are also examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo Bianconi & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1997. "International Effects of Government Expenditure in Interdependent Economies," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(1), pages 57-84, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:30:y:1997:i:1:p:57-84
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    Cited by:

    1. Ikeda, Shinsuke & Gombi, Ichiro, 2009. "Habit Formation In An Interdependent World Economy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(04), pages 477-492, September.
    2. Caporale, Guglielmo Maria & Ciferri, Davide & Girardi, Alessandro, 2011. "Fiscal shocks and real exchange rate dynamics: Some evidence for Latin America," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 709-723, September.
    3. Hashimzade, Nigar & Myles, Gareth D., 2010. "Growth And Public Infrastructure," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(S2), pages 258-274, November.
    4. Holger Strulik, 2002. "Fiscal Policy Reforms in a Global Economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(1), pages 73-91, January.
    5. Been-Lon Chen & Shun-Fa Lee, 2009. "General Fund Financing, Earmarking, Economic Stabilization, and Welfare," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(5), pages 507-538, September.
    6. K. Arin & Faik Koray, 2009. "Beggar thy Neighbor? The Transmission of Fiscal Shocks from the US to Canada," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 425-434, July.
    7. McKibbin, Warwick J. & Tan, Kang Yong, 2009. "Learning and international transmission of shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1033-1052, September.
    8. Birchenall, Javier A., 2008. "Equilibrium, convergence, and capital mobility in neoclassical models of growth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 10-13, April.
    9. Faik Koray & K. Peren Arin, 2006. "International Transmission of Fiscal Shocks: An Empirical Investigation," Departmental Working Papers 2006-03, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
    10. Delphine Béraud, 2002. "Transmission internationale des politiques budgétaires et imparfaite mobilité du capital," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 68(3), pages 287-311.

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