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Im Reformstau – oder das Elend des Verbändestaates / The backlog of reforms or the misery of the pressure groups

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  • Streit Manfred E.

Abstract

To begin with (part III.), two observations will be reported which should throw some light on the theme of this essay. Thereafter (part IV.) the theory of Public Choice will be employed to explain these observations as well as the jam of reforms. In part V., a political strategy to overcome the jam, called „consensual politics” will be assessed. Then (part VI.) it will be asked why members of the political class in Germany seem to shy away from reforms of economic and social policy. This leads to reservations (part VII.) regarding constitutional law, which one can have in view of this situation. Finally (part VIII.) it will be discussed what could be done in terms of a causal therapy to remove the jam of reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Streit Manfred E., 2008. "Im Reformstau – oder das Elend des Verbändestaates / The backlog of reforms or the misery of the pressure groups," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 31-38, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:59:y:2008:i:1:p:31-38:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2008-0105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Streit, Manfred E, 1988. "The Mirage of Neo-corporatism," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 603-624.
    2. Robert D. Tollison, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602, November.
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