IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/glecon/v15y2015i1p155-172n1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Did the Agreement on Safeguards Nullify their Use?

Author

Listed:
  • Hartigan James C.

    () (Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019–2103, USA)

Abstract

The Agreement on Safeguards (ASG) clarified the obligation to apply measures in accordance with the most favored nation (MFN) principle. Because foreign supply shocks can be non-uniform, MFN can induce nullification and impairment (N&I) complaints at the World Trade Organization from (third party) foreign suppliers not benefitting from the shock. These suppliers’ exports are reduced by both the beneficial shock to other exporters and the safeguard (SG) action by the home country. Although the ASG made use of SG more attractive by delaying requests for retaliation for three years in the absence of compensation for N&I, this may have been negated by the MFN requirement. Thus, it becomes a plausible explanation for the proliferation of antidumping actions. For recent U.S. anti-dumping cases against multiple exporting countries, dumping margins differing by over an order of magnitude were common. This suggests that alternative use of SG with an MFN requirement would elicit third party N&I.

Suggested Citation

  • Hartigan James C., 2015. "Did the Agreement on Safeguards Nullify their Use?," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 155-172, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:glecon:v:15:y:2015:i:1:p:155-172:n:1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gej.2015.15.issue-1/gej-2014-0033/gej-2014-0033.xml?format=INT
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John H. Jackson, 1997. "The World Trading System, 2nd Edition: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262600277, January.
    2. Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2008. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-77, September.
    3. Sykes, Alan O., 2006. "The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: A Commentary," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199277407.
    4. Beshkar, Mostafa, 2010. "Optimal remedies in international trade agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 455-466, April.
    5. Beshkar, Mostafa, 2010. "Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 35-48, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:glecon:v:15:y:2015:i:1:p:155-172:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.