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The Impact of Voter Uncertainty and Alienation on Turnout and Candidate Policy Choice

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  • Brown Natalya R.

    (Department of Political Science, Philosophy and Economics, Nipissing University, 100 College Drive Box 5002, North Bay, ON P1A 1A9, USA)

Abstract

Formal models of elections typically assume that voters are sure of their ideal points on the policy spectrum. Meanwhile, the empirical evidence suggests that voters are often uncertain about their ideal positions. In addition, alienation appears to play a key role in explaining voter turnout in elections. Using a spatial model that incorporates abstentions and the concepts of alienation and tolerance, I show that a positive correlation between extreme policy preferences and certainty among voters can affect voter turnout and result in the divergence of candidate policy choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Brown Natalya R., 2014. "The Impact of Voter Uncertainty and Alienation on Turnout and Candidate Policy Choice," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 273-292, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:14:y:2014:i:1:p:20:n:7
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2013-0007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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