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Ideology and Risk Focus: Conservatism and Opinion‐Writing In the U.S. Supreme Court

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  • Gordon Ballingrud

Abstract

Neuroscience proffers evidence that self‐described conservatives have stronger fear responses and aversion to risk than self‐described liberals. Combined with studies showing that judicial ideology drives the content of Supreme Court majority opinions, I argue that conservatism is linked to risk focus in Supreme Court majority opinions. I use the Language Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software on a sample of Supreme Court majority opinions, and find that conservative opinions score higher on the LIWC dimension called Risk Focus than liberal opinions. This effect is enhanced in criminal procedural cases. If conservative judges’ perceptions of risk are inflated, and if such perceptions are reflected in the binding opinions that they author, then such opinions’ heightened sense of risk may influence the perceptions of risk of lower‐court judges, which may in turn affect their decision‐making in such important areas as sentencing and convictions. Such a pattern raises important questions for the thousands of lower‐court decisions which impact the basic liberties of American citizens. Objective To determine whether judicial ideology affects the focus on risk of Supreme Court opinions. Methods Original, random sampling of 1200‐1300 Court opinions; use of LIWC software to analyze risk focus of each opinion; regression analysis of ideology on risk focus. Results As ideology becomes more conservative, the Court's opinions demonstrate increased evidence of focus on risk. This effect is pronounced in criminal procedure cases. Conclusion The theory is supported. Increasingly conservative Court opinions demonstrate an increased focus on risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon Ballingrud, 2021. "Ideology and Risk Focus: Conservatism and Opinion‐Writing In the U.S. Supreme Court," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(1), pages 281-300, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:102:y:2021:i:1:p:281-300
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12885
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