Competition And The Strategic Choice Of Managerial Incentives: The Relative Performance Case
In this paper we study the role of market competitiveness in a strategic delegation game in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in the firm's relative performance. In particular we study how the optimal delegation scheme - i.e. the distortion from pure profit maximization - is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We show that these two indexes of market competitiveness do not alter managerial incentives in the same way: while the optimal degree of delegation decreases as the market becomes less concentrated, it increases as demand becomes more elastic.
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Volume (Year): 62 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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