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On Lawsuits, Corporate Governance, and Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance

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  • Stuart L. Gillan
  • Christine A. Panasian

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> We examine whether information about firms' directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance coverage provides insights into the likelihood of shareholder lawsuits. Using Canadian firms, we find evidence that firms with D&O insurance coverage are more likely to be sued and that the likelihood of litigation increases with increased coverage. These findings are consistent with managerial opportunism or moral hazard related to the insurance purchase decision. We also find that higher premiums are associated with the likelihood of litigation, indicating that insurers price this behavior. Taken together, the findings suggest that coverage and premium levels have the potential to convey information about lawsuit likelihood, and a firm's governance quality, to the marketplace.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuart L. Gillan & Christine A. Panasian, 2015. "On Lawsuits, Corporate Governance, and Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 82(4), pages 793-822, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:82:y:2015:i:4:p:793-822
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    Cited by:

    1. Dain C. Donelson & Jennifer L. Glenn & Christopher G. Yust, 2022. "Is tax aggressiveness associated with tax litigation risk? Evidence from D&O Insurance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 519-569, June.
    2. Rebel A. Cole & Travis Davidson & Hongxia Wang, 2021. "Why do bank holding companies purchase bank-owned life insurance?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 29-59, July.
    3. Dain C. Donelson & Justin J. Hopkins & Christopher G. Yust, 2018. "The cost of disclosure regulation: evidence from D&O insurance and nonmeritorious securities litigation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 528-588, June.
    4. Sophie Wang, Qing & Lai, Shaojie & Pi, Shuwen & Anderson, Hamish, 2022. "Does directors' and officers' liability insurance induce empire building? Evidence from corporate labor investment," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    5. Chia-Chung Chan & Yung-Ho Chang & Chia-wei Chen & Yuwei Wang, 2019. "Directors’ liability insurance and investment-cash flow sensitivity," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 43(1), pages 27-43, January.
    6. Liao, Tsai-Ling & Chuang, Hwei-Lin & Wang, Jo-Yu, 2022. "Directors' and officers’ liability insurance and the pricing of seasoned equity offerings," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 12-26.
    7. Weng, Tzu-Ching & Chen, Guang-Zheng & Chi, Hsin-Yi, 2017. "Effects of directors and officers liability insurance on accounting restatements," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 437-452.
    8. Xia, Changyuan & Yang, Junjie & Yang, Zeng & Chan, Kam C., 2023. "Do directors with foreign experience increase the corporate demand for directors' and officers' liability insurance? Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    9. Li, Tianshi & Yang, Tina & Zhu, Jigao, 2022. "Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from independent directors’ voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    10. Kong, Xiaoran & Xu, Siping & Liu, Ming-Yu & Ho, Kung-Cheng, 2023. "Confucianism and D&O insurance demand of Chinese listed companies," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    11. Chang, Shih-Chung & Ren, Yayuan & Yeh, Jason, 2018. "The role of information: When is Directors’ and Officers’ insurance value-added?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 189-197.
    12. Naaraayanan, S. Lakshmi & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, 2021. "Does personal liability deter individuals from serving as independent directors?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 621-643.
    13. Huang, Rachel J. & Jeng, Vivian & Wang, Cheng-Wei & Yue, Jack C., 2021. "Does size and book-to-market contain intangible information about managerial incentives? Learning from corporate D&O insurance purchase," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    14. Wang, Di & Liu, Guangqiang & Xie, Linlin, 2023. "Can compulsory liability insurance reduce agency costs? Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    15. Li-Su Huang, 2022. "Directors and officers liability insurance and default risk," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 47(2), pages 375-408, April.
    16. Park, Min, 2018. "What drives corporate insurance demand? Evidence from directors' and officers' liability insurance in Korea," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 235-257.
    17. Lai, Yi-Hsun & Tai, Vivian W., 2019. "Managerial overconfidence and directors' and officers' liability insurance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    18. Su, Xuan-Qi, 2023. "Directors' and Officers' liability insurance and cross section of expected stock returns: A mispricing explanation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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