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The Efficiency of Categorical Discrimination in Insurance Markets

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  • Casey Rothschild

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  • Casey Rothschild, 2011. "The Efficiency of Categorical Discrimination in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 267-285, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:78:y:2011:i:2:p:267-285
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lando, Henrik, 2016. "Optimal rules of negligent misrepresentation in insurance contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 70-77.
    2. Jeffrey Clemens, 2015. "Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 109-134, April.
    3. Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild, 2011. "Risk Classification in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1137, CIRPEE.
    4. Levon Barseghyan & Francesca Molinari & Darcy Steeg Morris & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2020. "The Cost of Legal Restrictions on Experience Rating," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 38-70, March.
    5. Dardanoni, Valentino & Li Donni, Paolo, 2012. "Incentive and selection effects of Medigap insurance on inpatient care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 457-470.
    6. Keith J. Crocker & Nan Zhu, 2021. "The efficiency of voluntary risk classification in insurance markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(2), pages 325-350, June.
    7. Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 184-221, September.
    8. Richard Peter & Andreas Richter & Petra Steinorth, 2016. "Yes, No, Perhaps? Premium Risk and Guaranteed Renewable Insurance Contracts With Heterogeneous Incomplete Private Information," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(2), pages 363-385, June.
    9. Chatterjee, Indradeb & Macdonald, Angus S. & Tapadar, Pradip & Thomas, R. Guy, 2021. "When is utilitarian welfare higher under insurance risk pooling?," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(PB), pages 289-301.
    10. Ashesh Rambachan & Jon Kleinberg & Sendhil Mullainathan & Jens Ludwig, 2020. "An Economic Approach to Regulating Algorithms," NBER Working Papers 27111, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Peter, Richard & Richter, Andreas & Thistle, Paul, 2017. "Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 95-107.
    12. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    13. Christine Arentz, 2012. "Auswirkungen von Gentests in der Krankenversicherung," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 04/2012, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.

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