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Dynamic Insurance Contracts and Adverse Selection

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  • Maarten C. W. Janssen
  • Vladimir A. Karamychev

Abstract

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a dynamic version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model. We investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional and unconditional dynamic contracts. An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance companies offering contracts where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on the occurrence of past accidents. Conditional dynamic contracts make the actual contract also depend on individual past performance (such as in car insurances). We show that dynamic insurance contracts yield a welfare improvement only if they are conditional on past performance. With conditional contracts, the first‐best can be approximated if the contract lasts long. Moreover, this is true for any fraction of low‐risk agents in the population.

Suggested Citation

  • Maarten C. W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2005. "Dynamic Insurance Contracts and Adverse Selection," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 72(1), pages 45-59, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:72:y:2005:i:1:p:45-59
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-4367.2005.00115.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ming-Jyh Wang & Chieh-Hua Wen & Lawrence W Lan, 2010. "Modelling Different Types of Bundled Automobile Insurance Choice Behaviour: The Case of Taiwan*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(2), pages 290-308, April.
    2. Ben‐jiang Ma & Jing‐yu Ye & Geng Liu & Yuan‐ji Huang, 2020. "Adverse selection, limited compensation, and the design of environmental liability insurance contract in the case of enterprise bankruptcy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1327-1337, October.
    3. Ben‐jiang Ma & Jing‐yu Ye & Yuan‐ji Huang & Muhammad Farhan Bashir, 2020. "Research of two‐period insurance contract model with a low compensation period under adverse selection," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(3), pages 293-307, April.
    4. Alasseur, Clémence & Chaton, Corinne & Hubert, Emma, 2022. "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    5. Cl'emence Alasseur & Corinne Chaton & Emma Hubert, 2020. "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods: efficiency of in-kind insurance," Papers 2001.02099, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    6. Wiseman, Thomas, 2018. "Competitive long-term health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 144-150.
    7. Ma, Ben-jiang & Qiu, Chun-guang & Bi, Wen-jie, 2015. "An insurance contract with a low compensation period under adverse selection," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 67-74.

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