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Discrimination via Exclusion: An Experiment on Group Identity and Club Goods

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  • SURAJEET CHAKRAVARTY
  • MIGUEL A. FONSECA

Abstract

We study using laboratory experiments the impact on cooperation of allowing individuals to invest in group-specific, excludable public goods. We find that allowing different social groups to voluntarily contribute to such goods increases total contributions. However, a significant proportion of that contribution goes towards the group-specific club good, rather than the public good, even when the latter has higher financial returns to cooperation. We find significant evidence of in-group biases, which are manifested by positive in-group reciprocity. That is, club goods allow subjects to display their preferences for interaction with their in-group members, as well as in positive in-group reciprocity.
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  • Surajeet Chakravarty & Miguel A. Fonseca, 2017. "Discrimination via Exclusion: An Experiment on Group Identity and Club Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(1), pages 244-263, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:19:y:2017:i:1:p:244-263
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Catola & Simone D'Alessandro & Pietro Guarnieri & Veronica Pizziol, 2020. "Multilevel Public Goods Game: an Online Experiment," Discussion Papers 2020/263, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    2. Bicskei, Marianna & Lankau, Matthias & Bizer, Kilian, 2014. "How peer-punishment affects cooperativeness in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups: A public goods experiment with social identity," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 200, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    3. Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova & Lian Xue, 2019. "Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(5), pages 903-922, October.
    4. Marco Catola & Simone D'Alessandro & Pietro Guarnieri & Veronica Pizziol, 2021. "Personal and social norms in a multilevel public goods experiment," Discussion Papers 2021/272, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    5. Kesternich, Martin & Goeschl, Timo & Lohse, Johannes & Römer, Daniel & Reif, Christiane, 2016. "An online experiment on cooperation and groupishness across urban districts," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145848, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Catola, Marco & D’Alessandro, Simone & Guarnieri, Pietro & Pizziol, Veronica, 2023. "Multilevel public goods game: Levelling up, substitution and crowding-in effects," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    7. Diederich, Johannes & Goeschl, Timo, 2018. "Voluntary action for climate change mitigation does not exhibit locational preferences," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 175-180.
    8. Gallier, Carlo & Goeschl, Timo & Kesternich, Martin & Lohse, Johannes & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2019. "Leveling up? An inter-neighborhood experiment on parochialism and the efficiency of multi-level public goods provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 500-517.
    9. Catola Marco & Guarnieri Pietro & Marcon Laura & Spadoni Lorenzo, 2024. "Real-effort in the Multilevel Public Goods Game," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 24(3), pages 965-974.
    10. Marco Catola & Pietro Guarnieri & Veronica Pizziol & Chiara Rapallini, 2023. "Measuring the attitude towards a European public budget: A cross-country experiment," Discussion Papers 2023/300, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    11. Beekman, Gonne & Cheung, Stephen L. & Levely, Ian, 2017. "The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups: Evidence from a laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 168-183.
    12. Tom Lane, 2015. "Discrimination in the laboratory: a meta-analysis," Discussion Papers 2015-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    13. Diederich, Johannes & Goeschl, Timo, 2017. "Does Mitigation Begin At Home?," Working Papers 0634, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    14. Gerald Eisenkopf & Torben Kölpin, 2023. "Leadership and cooperation in growing teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 273-299, April.
    15. Francesca Pancotto & Simone Righi & Károly Takács, 2023. "Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 405-428, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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