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Agents, Stakeholders and Corporate Governance in Russian Firms

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  • Trevor, Igor, Mike Buck Filatotchev Wright

Abstract

This paper considers some developments within Russian privatized industrial firms 1992–94 through the lens of Stakeholder‐Agency Theory (SAT). Although it has its own shortcomings and weaknesses, SAT, unlike the traditional financial version of Agency Theory, at least contemplates the possibility of a transitional period during which enterprise governance structures can evolve. It is by now widely recognised that in the middle of deep economic crisis, the Russian economy is too volatile for longitudinal studies of formally structured samples of firms over a period of time. In any case, SAT is at a stage of development that has not yet yielded detailed predictions for scientific testing. Yet surveys of recently privatized firms in Russia do provide empirical data away from the origins of SAT, and it is argued that this fresh data suggests new research propositions that can hopefully lead to more theoretical refinement and ultimately testing. At the very least, SAT can be used as a heuristic device, capable of providing a way of looking at complex Russian developments in a structured way. A process of Russian privatization through management–employee buy‐outs involving giveaway distributions of shares has secured the compliance of the two main groups of enterprise stakeholders who could have prevented the withdrawal of the State from the governance of industrial enterprises, but has not yet produced a form of corporate governance structure that is likely to survive in the long term without State protection. In the longer term, international competitiveness can only be secured in Russia through investment in new products and processes, and the inadequacies of managers and other employees as sources of investable funds mean that incumbents must generate a more welcoming climate for outside investors. Even after such a short period since privatization and in the middle of a deep economic crisis, some enterprises are already favouring more efficient governance structures in a way consistent with SAT.

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  • Trevor, Igor, Mike Buck Filatotchev Wright, 1998. "Agents, Stakeholders and Corporate Governance in Russian Firms," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 81-104, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jomstd:v:35:y:1998:i:1:p:81-104
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6486.00085
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Young & Terence Tsai & Xinran Wang & Shubo Liu & David Ahlstrom, 2014. "Strategy in emerging economies and the theory of the firm," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 331-354, June.
    2. Doh, Jonathan P. & Teegen, Hildy, 2002. "Nongovernmental organizations as institutional actors in international business: theory and implications," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 665-684, December.
    3. Giuliana Bronzoni Liberato & Marcelo Sanches Pagliarussi, 2008. "Disclosure de estratégia em relatórios anuais: a influência das dimensões culturais, do sistema legal e da governança corporativa em empresas de quatro países," Fucape Working Papers 03, Fucape Business School.
    4. Bersant Hobdari, 2008. "Insider Ownership and Capital Constraints: An Empirical Investigation of the Credit Rationing Hypothesis in Estonia," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(6), pages 536-549, November.
    5. Peng, Mike W. & Buck, Trevor & Filatotchev, Igor, 2003. "Do outside directors and new managers help improve firm performance? An exploratory study in Russian privatization," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 348-360, November.
    6. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2007. "Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 849-902, December.
    7. Muravyev, Alexander & Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia, 2012. "Корпоративные Конфликты И Политика Фирм В Области Занятости И Заработной Платы [Corporate Governance Conflicts and Employment and Wage Policies of Companies]," MPRA Paper 40215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Puffer, Sheila M. & McCarthy, Daniel J., 2003. "The emergence of corporate governance in Russia," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 284-298, November.
    9. Michael A. Sartor & Paul W. Beamish, 2020. "Private Sector Corruption, Public Sector Corruption and the Organizational Structure of Foreign Subsidiaries," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 725-744, December.
    10. Zhonghua Wu & Andrew Delios, 2009. "The Emergence of Portfolio Restructuring in Japan," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 313-335, June.
    11. Eskil Goldeng & Leo A. Grünfeld & Gabriel R. G. Benito, 2008. "The Performance Differential between Private and State Owned Enterprises: The Roles of Ownership, Management and Market Structure," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(7), pages 1244-1273, November.
    12. Mike Wright & Igor Filatotchev & Robert E. Hoskisson & Mike W. Peng, 2005. "Strategy Research in Emerging Economies: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 1-33, January.
    13. Klaus E. Meyer & Hung Vo Nguyen, 2005. "Foreign Investment Strategies and Sub‐national Institutions in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Vietnam," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 63-93, January.
    14. Buck, Trevor & Filatotchev, Igor & Nolan, Peter & Wright, Mike, 2000. "Different paths to economic reform in Russia and China: causes and consequences," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 379-400, January.

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