IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v47y1999i1p41-67.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Social Status, Entry and Predation: The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929

Author

Listed:
  • Joel M. Podolny
  • Fiona M. Scott Morton

Abstract

The authors incorporate social status and regional affiliation—two variables of central sociological interest—into an economic analysis of entry and predation. They build on Scott Morton’s [1997] examination of entry and predation in the merchant shipping industry and examine whether the social status of an entrant owner impacts on the predation behavior of the incumbent cartels. They find that high social status entrants are significantly less likely (40%) to be preyed upon than the low social status entrants. They discuss several interpretations of this result. Subsequent analysis supports the hypothesis that cartel members use social status as an indicator of an entrant’s propensity to be a cooperative cartel participant.

Suggested Citation

  • Joel M. Podolny & Fiona M. Scott Morton, 1999. "Social Status, Entry and Predation: The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 41-67, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:47:y:1999:i:1:p:41-67
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00089
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00089
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-6451.00089?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Takuma Matsuda & Suguru Otani, 2022. "Unified Container Shipping Industry Data From 1966: Freight Rate, Shipping Quantity, Newbuilding, Secondhand, and Scrap Price," Papers 2211.16292, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    2. Luigi Pascali, 2017. "The Wind of Change: Maritime Technology, Trade, and Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(9), pages 2821-2854, September.
    3. Li, Li & Zhang, Rachel Q., 2015. "Cooperation through capacity sharing between competing forwarders," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 115-131.
    4. Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, 2010. "Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(6), pages 1176-1194, December.
    5. Stephen Martin, 2015. "Areeda–Turner and the Treatment of Exclusionary Pricing under U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(3), pages 229-252, May.
    6. Justus Haucap & Christina Heldman, 2023. "On the sociology of cartels," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 289-323, October.
    7. Carmine Ornaghi, 2009. "Positive Assortive Merging," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 323-346, June.
    8. Abdelbadie, Roba Ashraf & Salama, Aly, 2019. "Corporate governance and financial stability in US banks: Do indirect interlocks matter?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 85-105.
    9. Anna Minà & Giovanni Battista Dagnino & Gianluca Vagnani, 2020. "An interpretive framework of the interplay of competition and cooperation," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(1), pages 1-35, March.
    10. Souther, Matthew E., 2018. "The effects of internal board networks: Evidence from closed-end funds," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 266-290.
    11. Sofia Bapna, 2019. "Complementarity of Signals in Early-Stage Equity Investment Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(2), pages 933-952, February.
    12. Maurizio Franzini & Fabrizio Patriarca & Michele Raitano, 2020. "Market competition and parental background wage premium: the role of human and relational capital," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 18(3), pages 291-317, September.
    13. Stephen Martin, 2018. "Behavioral antitrust," Chapters, in: Victor J. Tremblay & Elizabeth Schroeder & Carol Horton Tremblay (ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization, chapter 15, pages 404-454, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Nowińska, Agnieszka & Schramm, Hans-Joachim, 2021. "Uncertainty, status-based homophily, versatility, repeat exchange and social exchange in the container shipping industry," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 524-536.
    15. Juan Luis Jiménez & Manuel Ojeda-Cabral & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2023. "Who Blows the Whistle on Cartels? Finding the Leniency Applicant at the European Commission," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 123-153, September.
    16. Christopher I. Rider & David Tan, 2015. "Labor Market Advantages of Organizational Status: A Study of Lateral Partner Hiring by Large U.S. Law Firms," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 356-372, April.
    17. Aven, Brandy & Morse, Lily & Iorio, Alessandro, 2021. "The valley of trust: The effect of relational strength on monitoring quality," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 179-193.
    18. Alberto Sa Vinhas & Jan B. Heide & Sandy D. Jap, 2012. "Consistency Judgments, Embeddedness, and Relationship Outcomes in Interorganizational Networks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(5), pages 996-1011, May.
    19. Pedro L. Marín & Richard Sicotte, 2003. "Exclusive Contracts And Market Power: Evidence From Ocean Shipping," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 193-214, June.
    20. Argenton, Cédric, 2019. "Colluding on excluding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 194-206.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:47:y:1999:i:1:p:41-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.