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A Search for the General Will in a Spatial Model

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  • Toyotaka Sakai

Abstract

type="main"> In Book IV, Chapter II of The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that the nearer opinion approaches unanimity in an assembly, the greater is the dominance of the general will. The present study revisits this classical argument in a one-dimensional spatial model with variable agendas. The study obtains a sufficient condition under which the Borda winner and the Condorcet winner almost coincide so that we can unambiguously find an alternative that conforms to the general will. This condition describes the existence of certain sympathy among voters on the evaluation of alternatives, and it is much weaker than the unanimity requirement.

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  • Toyotaka Sakai, 2015. "A Search for the General Will in a Spatial Model," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 260-270, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:66:y:2015:i:2:p:260-270
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jere.12063
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-1306, September.
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    8. Donald Saari, 2006. "Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 107-129, January.
    9. Peter Fishburn & William Gehrlein, 1976. "Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 79-88, December.
    10. Young, H. P., 1988. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1231-1244, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Masao Ogaki, 2022. "Economics of the community mechanism," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 433-457, July.

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