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Agency Theory and Entry Barriers in Banking

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  • Rose, Peter S

Abstract

Agency theory suggests that, in imperfect labor and capital markets, managers will seek to maximize their own utility at the expense of corporate shareholders. Indicators of such managerial behavior may include expense preferencing in which some factor costs are elevated above optimal levels needed for efficient production or avoidance of optimal risk positions that maximize wealth opportunities for stockholders. This study of more than 6400 banks finds that recent reductions in legal entry barriers have generated results generally consistent with agency theory with a lowering of noninterest operating expenses, increased employee productivity, increased acceptance of portfolio risk, and greater dividend rates to shareholders. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Rose, Peter S, 1992. "Agency Theory and Entry Barriers in Banking," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 27(3), pages 323-353, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:27:y:1992:i:3:p:323-53
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    Cited by:

    1. Ely, David P. & Song, Moon H., 2000. "Acquisition activity of large depository institutions in the 1990s:: An empirical analysis of motives," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 467-484.
    2. Lee, Chien-Chiang & Wang, Yurong & Zhang, Xiaoming, 2023. "Corporate governance and systemic risk: Evidence from Chinese-listed banks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 180-202.
    3. Mavrakana, Christina & Psillaki, Maria, 2019. "Do board structure and compensation matter for bank stability and bank performance? Evidence from European banks," MPRA Paper 95776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Devaney, Mike & Weber, Bill, 1995. "Local characteristics, contestability, and the dynamic structure of rural banking: A market study," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 271-287.
    5. Addo, Kwabena Aboah & Hussain, Nazim & Iqbal, Jamshed, 2021. "Corporate Governance and Banking Systemic Risk: A Test of the Bundling Hypothesis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    6. Haye, Eric M., 1997. "Corporate control effects and managerial remuneration in commercial banking," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 239-252.

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