On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs
This paper provides a political economy explanation for temporary exchange-rate-based stabilization programs by focusing on the distributional effects of real exchange-rate appreciation. I propose an economy in which agents are endowed with either tradable or non-tradable goods. Under a cash-in-advance assumption, a temporary reduction in the devaluation rate induces a consumption boom accompanied by real appreciation, which hurts the owners of tradable goods. The owners of non-tradables have to weigh two opposing effects: an increase in the present value of non-tradable goods wealth and a negative intertemporal substitution effect. For reasonable parameter values, owners of non-tradables are better off. Copyright 2002 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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Volume (Year): 14 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (07)
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