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Bundling as a Facilitating Device: A Reinterpretation of Leverage Theory

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  • Seidmann, Daniel J

Abstract

Tying-good monopolists that extract full consumer surplus from independent sales of their tying good may, nevertheless, choose to bundle in order to induce a favorable response by their tied-market rivals. In particular, bundling may facilitate supracompetitive prices for the tied good. Copyright 1991 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.

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  • Seidmann, Daniel J, 1991. "Bundling as a Facilitating Device: A Reinterpretation of Leverage Theory," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(232), pages 491-499, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:58:y:1991:i:232:p:491-99
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Edmond Baranes, 2006. "Bundling and Collusion on Communications Markets," Working Papers 06-17, NET Institute, revised Oct 2006.
    2. Almeida Costa, Luis & Dierickx, Ingemar, 2002. "Licensing and bundling," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 251-267, February.
    3. Oliver Budzinski & Katharina Wacker, 2007. "The Prohibition Of The Proposed Springer-Prosiebensat.1 Merger: How Much Economics In German Merger Control?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 281-306.
    4. Georg Wübker, 1999. "Sonderangebotspolitik und Preisbündelung," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 51(7), pages 693-713, July.
    5. Reisinger, Markus, 2004. "The Effects of Product Bundling in Duopoly," Discussion Papers in Economics 477, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. Spector, David, 2007. "Bundling, tying, and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 575-581, June.
    7. Ashutosh Prasad & R. Venkatesh & Vijay Mahajan, 2017. "Temporal product bundling with myopic and strategic consumers: Manifestations and relative effectiveness," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 341-368, December.
    8. Eugen Kovac, 2004. "Tying by a Non-monopolist," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp225, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    9. Daniel Flores Curiel, 2010. "La regulación del tamaño de los lotes habitacionales: un modelo de discriminación de precios," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 25(2), pages 407-424.
    10. Chung, Hui-Ling & Chen, Hung-Yi & Hu, Jin-Li & Lin, Yan-Shu, 2014. "Bundling With Quality Choice," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 55(2), pages 147-165, December.
    11. Gayer, Amit & Shy, Oz, 2016. "A welfare evaluation of tying strategies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 623-637.
    12. Ramanathan Subramaniam & R. Venkatesh, 2009. "Optimal Bundling Strategies in Multiobject Auctions of Complements or Substitutes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 264-273, 03-04.

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