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Comparing Mutual Fund Governance and Corporate Governance


  • Robert F. Radin
  • William B. Stevenson

    (Carroll School of Management, Boston College)


Governance of public corporations in the United States has operated under the agency model with regulatory strengthening since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. With this foundation in place, boards are empowered to utilise their power and influence and can effectively monitor the actions of management, intervening where necessary. In effect, the rules of engagement embodied in the structure and the law guide interactions and empowerment. The governance model of the mutual funds industry, representing over 8 trillion dollars, is often viewed as a mirror of the corporate world, but upon closer analysis is found to have significant structural differences that dilute the authority of directors. The two models are compared and analysed with recommendations made to strengthen the oversight of mutual funds. Copyright (c) 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert F. Radin & William B. Stevenson, 2006. "Comparing Mutual Fund Governance and Corporate Governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 367-376, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:14:y:2006:i:5:p:367-376

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    Cited by:

    1. Jiong Gong & Ping Jiang & Shu Tian, 2016. "Contractual mutual fund governance: the case of China," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 543-567, April.
    2. William Stevenson & Robert Radin, 2015. "The minds of the board of directors: the effects of formal position and informal networks among board members on influence and decision making," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(2), pages 421-460, May.
    3. Kurniawan, Meinanda & How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter, 2016. "Fund governance and style drift," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 59-72.

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