IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ajecsc/v77y2018i2p511-540.html

Controlling Corporate Power in China: Case Studies of Seed Companies and Water Distribution

Author

Listed:
  • Lanying Zhang
  • Guanqi Li
  • Huili He

Abstract

In the course of China's economic transition, the government set up a policy goal to gradually withdraw from the market, while, at the same time, increasing the intensity of anti†corruption actions. This article reviews the development of Chinese modern corporations and corresponding policy changes. The development and expansion of modern corporations as a result of reforms that occurred after 1978 reveals the government's decision not to fully withdraw from the market. When private companies are allowed to pursue maximum profits, especially in areas of public resources and services, society and the environment suffer severe negative consequences. Case studies of corporate control of seed companies and water utilities demonstrate in detail the damage caused by privatization. In order to protect the interests of society from corruption, government must concentrate on reducing the rent†seeking behavior of corporations and collusion between businesses and government officials. The Chinese government's fight against corruption in recent years has been based on its market involvement, as well as on its determination to confine the power of corporations, which is a tough game.

Suggested Citation

  • Lanying Zhang & Guanqi Li & Huili He, 2018. "Controlling Corporate Power in China: Case Studies of Seed Companies and Water Distribution," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(2), pages 511-540, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:77:y:2018:i:2:p:511-540
    DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12210
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12210
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ajes.12210?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tan Ngoc Vu & Duc Hong Vo & Michael McAleer, 2019. "Rent seeking for export licenses: Application to the Vietnam rice market," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2019-13, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    2. Aaron Soans & Masato Abe, 2015. "Bribery, Corruption and Bureaucratic Hassle: Evidence from Myanmar," ARTNeT Working Papers 152, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).
    3. François Facchini & Louis Jaeck & Hajer Kratou, 2026. "The migration–inequality debate: a reassessment through rent-seeking theory," Post-Print hal-05526464, HAL.
    4. Francesco Fallucchi & Jan Niederreiter & Massimo Riccaboni, 2021. "Learning and dropout in contests: an experimental approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(2), pages 245-278, March.
    5. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
    6. Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Mideksa, Torben K., 2008. "Transportation fuel use, technology and standards: The role of credibility and expectations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4695, The World Bank.
    7. Jongmoo Jay Choi & Hoje Jo & Jimi Kim & Moo Sung Kim, 2018. "Business Groups and Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 153(4), pages 931-954, December.
    8. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1989. "Protectionism in direct democracy," Discussion Papers, Series II 79, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    9. P. D. Jonson, 1979. "The State of Australian Economics: Stabilization and Industry Policies: A review article stimulated by F. H. Gruen (ed.), Surveys of Australian Economics, Volume 1," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(4), pages 297-305, December.
    10. Vittoria Idrisova, 2011. "Application of non-tariff barriers," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 150P.
    11. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2024. "Optimal sequential contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    12. Bin, Sheng, 2000. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China," Working Papers 10/2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy.
    13. Dendi Ramdani & Arjen Witteloostuijn, 2012. "The Shareholder–Manager Relationship and Its Impact on the Likelihood of Firm Bribery," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 108(4), pages 495-507, July.
    14. Kjell Hausken, 2023. "Two-period Colonel Blotto contest with cumulative investments over variable assets with resource constraints," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(11), pages 1-18, November.
    15. Robert Tollison, 1989. "Superdissipation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 97-98, April.
    16. Klepper, Gernot, 1984. "Endogenous tariff formation in a political market for protection," Kiel Working Papers 224, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    17. Karl Ove Moene & Asbjorn Rodseth, 1991. "Nobel Laureate: Trygve Haavelmo," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 175-192, Summer.
    18. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    19. Cohen, Joseph N., 2008. "Managing the Faustian bargain: monetary autonomy in the pursuit of development in Eastern Europe and Latin America," MPRA Paper 22435, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Jieming Zhu, 2005. "A Transitional Institution for the Emerging Land Market in Urban China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 42(8), pages 1369-1390, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:77:y:2018:i:2:p:511-540. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0002-9246 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.