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Are CEOs Paid for Performance? A Study of CEO’s Compensation in the Public Sector Corporations

Author

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  • Krishna Reddy

    (Faculty of Business, Design and Services Industries, Toi Ohomai Institute of Technology, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand)

Abstract

This study provides insight into CEO compensation dynamics in the public sector and private sector publicly listed firms in New Zealand. This research uses descriptive statistics, OLS regression, and the difference-in-difference method to analyze the compensation-performance relationship for the period 2005 to 2012. Our findings show that CEOs in the private sector publicly listed firms are receiving higher remuneration benefits. Our results suggest that firm sales and past compensation are the most important determinants of CEO cash-based as well as total compensation. Firms with a larger board size and the presence of a formal remuneration committee are likely to provide higher cash compensation than those without.

Suggested Citation

  • Krishna Reddy, 2023. "Are CEOs Paid for Performance? A Study of CEO’s Compensation in the Public Sector Corporations," Journal of Economic Analysis, Anser Press, vol. 2(1), pages 16-35, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bba:j00001:v:2:y:2023:i:1:p:16-35:d:27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Hao, Xiaoli & Wen, Shufang & Li, Ke & Wu, Junwei & Wu, Haitao & Hao, Yu, 2023. "Environmental governance, executive incentive, and enterprise performance: Evidence from Chinese mineral enterprises," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(PA).
    4. Xiaoli Hao & Shufang Wen & Jianing Zhu & Haitao Wu & Yu Hao, 2024. "Can business managerial capacity improve green innovation in different industries? Evidence from Chinese listed companies," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 2600-2620, March.

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