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A concorrência fiscal entre os municípios portugueses

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Luisa Coimbra

    (Câmara Municipal do Porto, Porto, Portugal)

  • José da Silva Costa

    (CIJE and Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto, Porto)

  • Armindo Carvalho

    (Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto, Porto)

Abstract

Neste artigo pretendemos responder a duas questões de investigação principais: Há sinais de concorrência fis- cal entre os municípios portugueses? Em que imposto é mais provável os municípios portugueses se envolverem em concorrência fiscal? De acordo com os resultados ob- tidos nesta investigação, há interacção estratégica entre os municípios quando decidem a taxa de IRS que reverte para a receita fiscal do município. Para a Contribuição Autárqui- ca (CA) a evidência empírica não é conclusiva porque quando consideramos efeitos fixos espaciais o coeficiente da variável que capta a concorrência fiscal não é estatis- ticamente significante. Para o imposto municipal sobre imóveis (IMI), tanto para propriedade urbana não avali- ada como para a propriedade urbana avaliada, a evidên- cia empírica é de que ocorre concorrência fiscal entre os municípios no período de 2004-2007. Idêntico resultado é obtido para a propriedade urbana avaliada quando se con- sidera o período de 2008-2009. Contudo, para o período de 2008-2009, a evidência empírica relativa a propriedade urbana não avaliada é inconclusiva. Para a DERRAMA en- contrámos também evidência empírica de concorrência fis- cal nos períodos de 2000-2007 e 2008-2009. Com excepção da Contribuição Autárquica (CA), a evidência empírica so- bre concorrência fiscal entre municípios não é muito difer- ente para os diferentes impostos analisados, o que pode ser explicado pelo facto de este ser um assunto recente na agenda política dos municípios. Apesar das diferenças nas estimações por tipo de imposto e período de análise, os resultados não contradizem a hipótese de que a gestão do ciclo político-económico influencia escolha das taxas dos impostos municipais.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Luisa Coimbra & José da Silva Costa & Armindo Carvalho, 2011. "A concorrência fiscal entre os municípios portugueses," RPER, Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento Regional, issue 28, pages 27-38, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:apd:rper00:y:2011:i:28:id:331
    DOI: 10.59072/rper.vi28.331
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    References listed on IDEAS

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